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Abstract
In this paper, a word based chaotic image encryption scheme for gray images is proposed,
that can be used in both synchronous and self-synchronous modes. The encryption scheme
operates in a finite field where we have also analyzed its performance according to numer-
ical precision used in implementation. We show that the scheme not only passes a variety
of security tests, but also it is verified that the proposed scheme operates faster than other
existing schemes of the same type even when using lightweight short key sizes.
KeyWords: chaos, image encryption, self-synchronization.
1 Introduction
Several image encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature based on different
approaches for design or implementation, while chaos-based encryption schemes have the
advantage of presenting a good combination of speed and security.
It seems that Fridrich [8] is among the first contributors who has proposed an image
encryption scheme based on chaotic maps, where in [8] certain invertible chaotic 2D maps on
a torus or on a square have been used to create new symmetric block encryption schemes.
Many other chaotic image encryption schemes have been proposed ever since with different
properties and motivations for application (e.g. see [7, 9, 13, 17, 19] and references therein).
Strictly speaking, one may consider the following challenges when one is trying to design
an image encryption scheme (see [16, 19, 20] and references therein):
• The scheme must have a relatively high speed of performance since images usually
consist of large blocks of data.
• Since the information content of an image is contained in high frequencies the scheme
must possess a high mixing performance.
• According to typical applications, the scheme must be relatively lightweight and should
be able to operate with relatively small keys with acceptable security guaranties.
• The scheme must guaranty secure, reliable and fast rates of data transfer.
Considering above facts, chaos-based stream ciphers may seem to be a solution while,
• Although, concentrating on chaotic word-based designs operating in a finite field may
seem to be a solution for fast and reliable encryption, one must note that discretizing
chaotic maps usually deteriorate their chaotic properties that may lead to weak security
conditions.
1Correspondence should be addressed to daneshgar@sharif.ir.
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• Data transfer reliability can be achieved using self-synchronization, however, security
guaranty is much harder in presence of self-synchronization for the feedback structure.
It seems that one of the main problems with chaotic encryption schemes introduced so far is
the direct application of the chaotic sequence which is far from being pseudorandom when it is
digitized, which will definitely lead to security weaknesses when the scheme is not design prop-
erly (e.g. see [14, 21]). Therefore, to solve the above mentioned and seemingly contradicting
challenges, we introduce an image encryption scheme in which we have used a chaotic string
indirectly to generate a pseudorandom permutation whose pseudorandomness is guaranteed
by the results of [1]. On the other hand to compensate the weakness of discrete permutations
in uniformly encrypting the high frequency image data (mainly based on correlation along
edges) we use a linear feedback to achieve the acceptable uniformization. In other words we,
• Use pseudorandom permutations generated by chaotic maps.
• Use word-based chaos to guaranty fast encryption.
• Compensate discretization phenomenon using a fast linear feedback.
• Make sure that the scheme can perform in both synchronous and self-synchronous modes
by setting parameters, to be able to be used in different channel conditions in a reliable
way.
• Make sure that the scheme has a fast receiver as an unknown input observer of the
transmitter.
PLCIE 2 is an extension of PLC scheme introduced in [12] tuned to be used for image
encryption. PLCIE is a word-based chaotic encryption scheme having ℓ-word state vectors
that can be controlled by users, giving sufficient flexibility for multi-level security. PLCIE
consists of a Initializing phase, internal state update, memory update, encryption and de-
cryption that will be described in detail in Section 2. In Section 3, we apply various tests to
verify the performance and the security of the proposed scheme.
2 Description of PLCIE
A digital image usually can be interpreted as a function z = f(x, y) of physical horizontal
x and vertical y coordinates, that determine illumination or grayscale value of the picture
element (or the pixel) at location (x, y). A pixel is the smallest addressable element in a
display device. The level of illumination at each pixel has a value between 0 and 255. Thus,
in a digital image, the grayscale of each pixel is presented by one byte and the whole image is
presented by a large matrix of bytes. The histogram of a digital image is a discrete function
h(r
k
) = n
k
, where r
k
is the k-th gray level and n
k
is the number of pixels of the image with
gray level r
k
.
Let q be a prime power, Fq be the finite field on q elements
3 and f : R→R be a chaotic
map (e.g. as in [6]). Consider a family of maps as π : K×Fq→Fq such that for any k ∈ K the
map π(k, .) is a discrete chaotic permutation on Fq as a discrete approximation of f (e.g. as
defined in [3]). The two-variable map π gets a value k ∈ K as well as a field element a ∈ Fq ,
2PseudoLinear Chaotic Image Encryption (also see [5] for a switching version and its properties).
3The cryptosystem can be defined on any finite field, however, in our real life applications with a lightweight
setup we set Fq = GF (16) or Fq = GF (17).
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Table 1: Functions used in PLCIE
Title Form
State update ϕ
k
: (F
ℓ
q
)
2
×M
4
→F
ℓ
q
Keystream generator γ
k
: (F
ℓ
q
)
2
×M
2
→F
ℓ
q
Encryption ε
k
: (F
ℓ
q
)
2
×M→F
ℓ
q
Decryption δ
k
: (F
ℓ
q
)
2
×M→F
ℓ
q
Memory update µ : (F
ℓ
q
)
2
→F
ℓ
q
and returns π
k
(a)
def
= π(k, a). In 2.1 we will describe how one may compute this family of
chaotic permutations.
For all t ≥ 1, consider pt , ct , zt ∈ Fq , and let 〈pt〉, 〈ct〉, 〈zt〉 be the plain, the cipher, and the
keystream sequences in time, respectively. Let ℓ be an integer. Also, define column vectors
pt , ct , zt in F
ℓ
q
as
pt
def
= [p
(1)
t
, 0, · · · , 0]
T
, ct
def
= [c
(1)
t
, c
(2)
t
, · · · , c
(ℓ)
t
]
T
, zt
def
= [z
(1)
t
, z
(2)
t
, · · · , z
(ℓ)
t
]
T
.
The internal state st ∈ F
ℓ
q
and internal memory c˜t ∈ F
ℓ
q
are also defined as column vectors
st
def
= [s
(1)
t
, s
(2)
t
, · · · , s
(ℓ)
t
]
T
, c˜t
def
= [c˜
(ℓ)
t
, c˜
(ℓ−1)
t
, · · · , c˜
(1)
t
]
T
.
Define the map ℘
k
: F
ℓ
q
→F
ℓ
q
as follows
℘
k
([a1 , a2 , · · · , aℓ ]
T
)
def
= [π
k
(a1), πk(a2), · · · , πk(aℓ)]
T
.
PLCIE scheme uses a set of functions introduced in Table 1 in which M stands for the set
of all ℓ× ℓ matrices on Fq . Also PLCIE has a initializing phase along with two other main
phases called the kernel computation phase, and the encryption/decryption phase that will
be described in what follows.
2.1 The initializing phase
In this phase, a chaotic sequence is produced, that gives rise to the pseudorandom permutation
π
k
. Also, the initial value vector IV is set according to a uniform distribution. The secret
key is a binary string consisting of
• encoding of the system precision prec (one bit indicating 16 or 32 bits representation of
numbers).
• encodings of the initial values of the chaotic map (r0 , l0), chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, where r0 ∈R (0, 1) (presented in prec bits floating point format) and l0 ∈R
{1, 2, · · · , 2
prec
− 1} (presented in prec bits integer format).
• encodings of a number a ∈
R
Fq and (i1 , j1 , ei1 j1
), · · · , (in , jn , ein jn ), in which n <
l2
2
,
indicating an encoding of the matrix E (to be used later) such that the entries not
mentioned in the coding is set to the default value a.
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Let ι be a constant integer of order O(ℓ) (e.g. for ℓ = 8 this parameter can be chosen as
ι = 32). Then, IV is a 2ℓ word vector which is used to preset s
−ι and c˜−ι . Note that here
one may use a random string of length ι as a prefix of plaintext for whitening.
For the chaotic map we have chosen a particular version of the Re´nyi map [1] with pa-
rameter β = 3 which is defined as follows,
ψ(x) = 3x− ⌊3x⌋ , x ∈ (0, 1). (2.1.1)
In [1] the discrete version of this map (called ψ
d
(x)) is defined as,
g(x) =
⌊2
prec
x⌋
2prec
, ψ
d
(x) = 3g(x) − ⌊3g(x)⌋ , x ∈ (0, 1). (2.1.2)
Also it is shown in the same reference that the map has a positive Lyapunov exponent
and any of its’ successive iterations has acceptable statistical properties. However, we will see
that this map by itself is not good enough to be solely used in an image encryption scheme
as a pseudorandom source for permutations (see Section 2.1).
After producing the iterated sequence {ψ
t
d
(r0)}
l0+q
t=1
, and eliminating the first l0 transient
elements, the sequence is used to generate a pseudorandom permutation.
Figure 1: Peper original versus value-permuted image.
The initializing algorithm gets the secret key k, initial value IV , sequence4 vt = {ψ
t
d
(r0)}
l0+q
t=l0+1
and its sorted sequence x
i
= {ψ
i
d
(r0)}
q
i=1
, and returns a key permutation π
k
, an initial state
vector s
−ι and an initial memory vector c˜−ι . To generate the chaotic permutation πk , we
follow [2] and define,
π
k
(i) =
{
j ψ
d
(x
i
) = x
j
j′ (v
q−1 = xi and v0 = xj′ ).
(2.1.3)
Unfortunately, this pseudorandom permutation is not by itself sufficient for image encryption
mainly because of correlations existing in an image, most of which concentrated in high
frequency components (e.g. see Figure 1).
2.2 The kernel computation phase
This phase contains state update algorithm and key stream generator as shown in Equations
(2.2.1) , (2.2.2) and (2.2.3). In the next paragraph, synchronous and self-synchronous modes
4Here we may assume that the vector vt does not have repeated entries by chaotic properties of the Renyi
map. Clearly since the probability of having a bad vector with two identical entries is negligible one may
eventually find a good vector by repeating the process.
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are explained. As one may note, both modes have similar chaotic maps, internal states
and permutation-substitution components, but the self-synchronous mode has an internal
memory and a memory update function in order to synchronize both transmitter and receiver
simultaneously. The memory update function µ is defined as follows,
µ(c˜t , ct−1)
def
= Mc˜t + ct−1
in which
c˜t = [c˜
(ℓ)
t
, c˜
(ℓ−1)
t
, · · · , c˜
(2)
t
, c˜
(1)
t
]
T
, c˜
(i)
t
= c
t−ℓ+i−1
,
M
def
=


0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 1 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 0

 .
The state update algorithm gets a current state st and returns the next state st+1 . Clearly,
as in (2.2.1), the state update algorithm consists of a linear part and a chaotic permutation.
The linear part not only connects a relation between the internal state and previous cipher
symbols, but also increases shuffling property which results in an almost perfect uniformly
distributed output. The keystream generator algorithm gets the current state st and returns
the keystream zt .
Let A,B,D,E,F,W ∈ M while F is invertible. The kernel of PLCIE in the synchronous
mode, Kernels , is defined as follows.
Kernels :


initial : π
k
,A,B,D,
s
t+1 = Dst +A℘k(st)
zt = B℘k(st)
(2.2.1)
To control the error diffusion rate, correct state recovery and maintain stability, one may
improve the above kernel to work in a self-synchronized mode as follows,
EKernelss :


initial : π
k
,A,B,D,E,W
s
t+1 = Wc˜t +Dst +A℘k(st) +E℘k(pt)
c˜
t+1 = Mc˜t + ct−1
zt = Wc˜t +B℘k(st),
(2.2.2)
Note that one get the synchronous mode whenW = E = 0. It is proved in [12] (see Theorem A
below) that if
1- A = EF−1B,
2- there exits n0 ∈ N such that D
n0 = 0
then EKernelss has an (unknown input) observer defined as
DKernelss :


initial : π
k
, 〈ct〉 ,A,B,D,E,F,W
ŝ
t+1 = Wc˜t +Dŝt +A℘k(ŝt) +EF
−1
(ct − ẑt)
c˜
t+1 = Mc˜t + ct−1
ẑt = Wc˜t +B℘k(ŝt).
(2.2.3)
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2.3 The encryption/decryption phase
Based on the kernel equations we have the following procedures for encryption and decryption
in general,
Enc :


input : 〈pt〉
EKernel
output : ct = zt + F℘k(pt).
(2.3.1)
Dec :


input : 〈ct〉
DKernel
output : p̂t = ℘
−1
k
(F
−1
(ct − ẑt)).
(2.3.2)
Note that in this setting the matrix E is secret and is included in the key. The vector IV
is chosen at random and is sent along with the ciphertext to make sure that a trivial CPA
attack is not applicable. Moreover, if one is not working in a lightweight setting then one may
also encode the matrix B in the key and make it secret to enhance security conditions of the
scheme.
Based on the following theorem [12], by making A secret as a function of the key and
choosing D properly, one may prove that a receiver as an UIO exists. We recall the result
along with a sketch of proof for the scheme as follows.
Theorem A. In PLCIE , if
a) A = EF
−1
B,
b) The matrix D is nilpotent i.e. there exists an integer n0 ∈ N such that D
n0 = 0,
then
I. ∀t, t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n0}, st+1 depends on the ℓ+ t previous cipher symbols.
II. ∀t, t ∈ {n0 + 1, n0 + 2, · · · }, st+1 depends on the ℓ+ n0 previous cipher symbols.
III. After n0 time step, an unknown input observer can detect correct plain symbols.
Sketch of proof.
For (I), at first, by induction on t ≥ 1 we prove an equivalent explicit form of the internal
state s
t+1 as follow,
s
t+1 =
t∑
j=1
D
j−1
[(I−EF
−1
)Wc˜
t−j+1 +EF
−1
c
t−j+1 ] +D
t
s1 . (2.3.3)
Now by definition 2.2 of c˜t we have,
c˜t = [c˜
(ℓ)
t
, c˜
(ℓ−1)
t
, · · · , c˜
(2)
t
, c˜
(1)
t
]
T def
= [c
(1)
t−1
, c
(1)
t−2
, · · · , c
(1)
t−ℓ
]
T
and consequently, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t, we can write c˜
t−j+1 as follow,
c˜
t−j+1 = [c
(1)
t−j
, c
(1)
t−j−1
, · · · , c
(1)
t−j+1−ℓ
]
T
,
proving part (I).
For (II), suppose that there exist n0 ∈ N such that D
n0 = 0. Then expand s
t+1 for
t = n0 + 1 as,
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s
t+1 = D
0
[(I −EF
−1
)Wc˜
n0+1
+EF
−1
c
n0+1
]+
D
1
[(I −EF
−1
)Wc˜n0 +EF
−1
cn0
]+
...
D
n0−1 [(I −EF
−1
)Wc˜2 +EF
−1
c2 ]+
D
n0 [(I−EF
−1
)Wc˜1 +EF
−1
c1 ]+
D
n0+1s1 ,
and since D
n0 = 0, for any ν ≥ 1 and an arbitrary state sn0+ν we have,
s
n0+ν
= D
0
[(I−EF
−1
)Wc˜
n0+ν−1
+EF
−1
c
n0+ν−1
]+
D
1
[(I−EF
−1
)Wc˜
n0+ν−2
+EF
−1
c
n0+ν−2
]+
...
D
n0−1 [(I−EF
−1
)Wc˜ν +EF
−1
cν ]+
def
= φ2(c
(1)
ν−ℓ
, · · · , c
(1)
n0+ν−1
),
(2.3.4)
proving (II).
For (III), define e
t+1
def
= s
t+1 − ŝt+1 and note that by 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 we have,
e
t+1 = st+1 − ŝt+1
= Wc˜t +Dst +A℘k(st) +E℘k(pt)−
(Wc˜t +Dŝt +A℘k(ŝt) +EF
−1
(ct − ẑt))
= Det +A℘k(st) +E℘k(pt)−
A℘
k
(ŝt)−EF
−1
(ct − ẑt).
(2.3.5)
Using 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 one may conclude that,
e
t+1 = Det +A℘k(st)−EF
−1
(Wc˜t +B℘k(st)−Wc˜t)
= Det +A℘k(st)−EF
−1
(B℘
k
(st),
(2.3.6)
and consequently,
e
t+1 = Det , (2.3.7)
that proves (III).

3 Performance analysis
In this section, we concentrate on the performance and statistical evaluation of our proposed
scheme PLCIE .
First, let us consider the performance of the scheme in general and most importantly in
lightweight setups. Since, to the best of our knowledge, there is no self-synchronous image
encryption scheme similar to our proposed scheme, we have decided to compare our scheme
with Moustique [4] which is one of the fastest proposed self-synchronous stream cipher existing
so far5 [10].
5Although there exists severe attacks to Moustique (e.g. see [11]), we have chosen this scheme since we are
not aware of any better self-synchronized stream cipher similar to what we have proposed.
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In this regard, consider a 4N -bit input plaintext given to both systems. To generate the
ciphertext, the number of field operations for Moustique is 6000N . On the other hand, for
PLCIE we may consider two sets of parameters which are comparable with Moustique, namely
(prec = 16, ℓ = 8, n = 6 and Fq = GF (16)) with key length 97 and (prec = 32, ℓ = 8, n = 5
and Fq = GF (16)) with key length 119. In both of these setups the number of field operations
to produce the ciphertext given a 4N -bit plaintext is 528N which shows that PLCIE is about
11 times faster than Moustique in bit production. Of course one should also note that in our
setup we use a bandwidth 8 times more than Moustique, which give rise to an over-all speed
factor of 1.5 in favor of PLCIE .
Figure 2: Images (a),(c),(e),(g),(i) depict histograms of original images and images
(b),(d),(f),(h),(j) depict histograms of encrypted images.
To make sure about the uniformity of the output distribution first refer to Figure 2 that
shows the histograms of some original standard gray images and their corresponding encrypted
images, showing an almost uniformly distributed outputs. In order to be more precise, we
have used NIST Sp-800 Suite [18] tests for 40 binary sequences of cipher images with 1000, 000
bit length, generated for different secret keys. As it is reported in Figure 3 for the Peper image
below, PLCIE passes all these tests with an acceptable confidence interval.
On the other hand, in order to test the influence of changing a single symbol in the original
image on the encrypted image, the number of symbols’ change rate is measured by calculating
NPCR (number of symbol change rate) and UACI (unified average changing intensity) as
follows (e.g. see [20] for more on these standard parameters),
NPCR =
100
W ×H
∑
i,j
D(i, j) , UACI =
100
W ×H
∑
i,j
| C(i, j) − C ′(i, j) |
q − 1
in which W and H are the width and the height of encrypted images. Note that NPCR mea-
sures the percentage of different symbols between the two cipher images and UACI measures
the average intensity of differences between the two cipher images. Two encrypted images
C and C ′, whose corresponding original images P and P ′ have only one-symbol difference,
are considered. A two-dimensional array D with the same size of C and C ′ is defined for
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Figure 3: Randomness of binary sequences for Peper cipher image
which D(i, j) = 1 if C(i, j) 6= C ′(i, j), and D(i, j) = 0 otherwise. As Table 2 reflects our
experimental results, PLCIE has good cipher image sensibility to little purtubation in plain
images.
Also, the cipher image dependency on a small perturbation in secret key bits is analyzed.
Table 3 shows the detailed results for the encryption of the Peper image with two secret keys,
which have just a one bit difference.
3.1 Cipher image entropy and correlation analysis
Information entropy is one of the most significant features of randomness. Information entropy
h(m) of a message m can be measured by the following formula,
h(m) = −
n−1∑
i=0
p(m
i
)log2(p(mi)), (3.1.1)
where n is the total number of symbols in the message m and p(m
i
) represents the probability
of the occurrence of symbol m
i
. Theoretically, for a random code source with an alphabet of
size n, the ideal information entropy must be h(m) = log
2
(n). Table 4 shows that in PLCIE
the entropy of encrypted images for four standard images are close to ideal values, which
shows robustness against entropy attacks.
Also, there is usually strong correlations between adjacent symbols in the input image.
A secure image encryption scheme should remove this correlation to make statistical attacks
infeasible. In order to test the correlation between adjacent symbols, 2500 random pairs
of adjacent symbols (in horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions) are selected and the
correlation coefficient of each pair is computed before and after encryption using the following
equations,
Table 2: Plain image sensitivity analysis
NPCR UACI
Baboon 99.552 33.171
Camera Man 99.572 33.239
Einstein 99.543 33.229
Lena 99.540 33.239
Peper 99.597 33.250
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Table 3: Key sensitivity analysis
NPCR UACI
Peper 99.549 33.219
Figure 4: Correlation plot of adjacent symbols in the Lena plain and cipher images
Cor =
∑N
i=1
(x
i
− x¯)(y
i
− y¯)√(∑N
i=1
(x
i
− x¯)2)
)(∑N
i=1
(y
i
− y¯)2
) (3.1.2)
where x¯ and y¯ are average values. The correlation plot of the plain image and the cipher
image of Lena is illustrated in Figure 4. Also, Table 5 summarizes the results corresponding
to 4 other images.
3.2 Self-synchronizing property analysis
Another feature of PLCIE is the fact that the scheme can be used in a self-synchronous mode
maintaining error correction using an unknown input observer as a receiver (e.g. see [15] for
more on this method). To show this property, Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the result of
and error recovery in the Baboon image where the experiment are depicted numerically and
graphically in these figures.
Table 4: Byte, symbol and bit entropy analysis of plain and cipher images
Bit entropy Symbol entropy Byte entropy
P lain Cipher P lain Cipher P lain Cipher
Baboon 0.84 0.97 3.92 4.0 7.33 7.69
Camera Man 0.77 0.97 3.85 4.0 7.01 7.69
Einstein 0.78 0.97 3.83 4.0 6.88 7.68
Lena 0.79 0.97 3.94 4.0 7.44 7.68
Peper 0.77 0.97 3.98 4.0 7.59 7.69
Table 5: Correlation analysis of plain and cipher images
Plain Cipher
Hori. V ert. Diag. Hori. V ert. Diag.
Baboon 0.669 0.723 0.643 0.019 0.034 0.005
Camera Man 0.935 0.976 0.913 0.006 0.011 0.019
Einstein 0.892 0.723 0.912 0.027 0.034 0.006
Lena 0.910 0.961 0.913 0.035 0.019 0.001
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Figure 5: Numerical difference of sent cipher image data and received the one.
Figure 6: Error recovery in the self-synchronous mode for Baboon.
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